The Farmers Union and the 1948 Henry Wallace Campaign WILLIAM C. PRATT THE 1948 HENRY WALLACE CAMPAIGN was a watershed in the history of the American left. Despite high hopes, this third party candidacy made a dismal showing at the ballot box. None of its backers, including the candidate, had believed that it actually would elect the next president, but they had expected to solidify the liberal-left elements in the country and build an electoral base for subsequent campaigns. Instead, the campaign resulted in the discrediting of left-wing third party efforts, the stigmatization of popular front politics, and the increased hegemony of anti-Communists within the ranks of American liberalism. The 1948 Wallace campaign was one of the left's worst setbacks in recent American history. This outcome often is explained by increasing Cold War tensions, marked especially by the 1948 Czech and Berlin crises; the close identification between the Wallace effort and the Communist party; the shrewd campaign strategy of the Truman campaign; and the bungling of the Wallace campaign itself.^ Whatever the explanation, Wallace's declining political base from early 1947 through the 1948 campaign played a major role in his ultimate poor showing in the election. An exploration of the response of one liberal organization-the National Farmers Union (NFU)-to Wallace's 1948 effort should help us better understand the challenge this episode made to mainstream American liberalism, 1. The 1948 Wallace campaign is treated in Karl M. Schmidt, Henry A. Wallace: Quixotic Crusade 1948 (Syracuse, NY, 1960 ; Curtis D. MacDougall, Gideon's Army (New York, 1965) ; Norman D. Markowitz, The Rise and Fall of The People's Century: Henry A. Wallace and American Liberalism, 1941 -1948 (New York, 1973 ; Allen Yarnell, Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1974) ; Richard J. Walton, Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War (New York, 1976) . 349 and the difficulties that the third party movement had in recruiting among liberal groups. JAMES G. PATTON AND THE NFU were an important team on the playing fields of American liberalism in the 1940s. During World War II Patton emerged as one of the chief spokesmen for progressive reform and was identified with the left wing of the New Deal coalition. His organization was the nation's only liberal farm group, and in some eyes he may have been seen as the agricultural equivalent of Walter Reuther. It seemed that every liberal effort wanted Patton's backing in the war years and in the postwar era.^ While Patton was in the spotlight, he shared power with two other key Farmers Union leaders: M. W. (Bill) Thatcher, general manager of the Grain Terminal Association (GTA), which was the organization's largest cooperative enterprise, and Glenn J. Talbott, president of the North Dakota Farmers Union, which was the organization's largest state affiliate. Thatcher had been one of the builders of the NFU in the Upper Midwest and headed up the Union's grain coop empire in the region. A forceful personality, he exerted a great deal of influence within the organization as a consequence of his political skills (both within and outside the Union), GTA's financial resources, and its army of fieldmen. GTA checks for educational funds were an important source of income for state unions in the region. Talbott, on the other hand, may have been the single most influential figure in the Fanners Union. North Dakota's large membership provided him with a base, and he served as chairman of the NFU's executive committee. Patton was national president, but he clearly shared power with both Thatcher and the North Dakota leader.T he Farmers Union had been one of the nation's most important farm organizations since its founding in 1902. It claimed to be a descendant of earlier agrarian movements, and one observer has characterized it as "Populism-Up-to-Date." Though it lagged behind the Farm Bureau and the Grange in membership, the Fanners Union had a major presence in the Upper Midwest and on the Plains.* Patton, Thatcher, and Talbott were part of the New Deal faction that had taken over the organization in the late 1930s and eventually elected Patton as its president in 1940. Though usually close to Roosevelt, the NFU leader was not reluctant to criticize Administration policy from time to time.P atton's public posture during and immediately after the war placed him among popular front liberals who were willing to work with Communists in a domestic political alliance against fascism abroad and at home. Then, it was not unusual for liberals and Communists to work together on specific tasks. A popular front or left-liberal coalition emerged within elements of the Democratic party, several CIO unions, some civil rights organizations, and other groups, and in many cases there was little public stigma about it at the time.* But in the postwar era, these wartime associations came back to haunt many of those who had been involved in them.
A close relationship between the Farmers Union and Henry Wallace had existed since the late 1930s. These ties had been strengthened as a result of a "sweetheart arrangement" between the Department of Agriculture's Farm Security Administration (FSA) and the FU cooperatives. FSA loans to farmers in the Upper Midwest often included funds to buy stock in local grain cooperatives, which, in turn, affiliated with the Thatchermanaged GTA. C. B. "Beanie" Baldwin, a key Wallace aide, ad- (New York, 1974), 90-114, 305-10. The term popular front has been applied by historians to this leftliberal alliance after the fact; it was not used by its participants in the 1940s. 351 ministered the FSA during the war and had close ties with both Thatcher and Patton. He recruited Patton for the National Citizens Political Action Committee (NCPAC), which backed FDR and other liberal candidates in 1944, and he was an intimate friend of the NFU president well into the postwar period.T he connection between Wallace and the Farmers Union was not based solely on administration farm policy. Like the CIO, the NFU took positions on a variety of issues not directly related to its members' economic interests. Patton and his organization emerged as strong proponents of civil rights, including the abolition of the poll tax; they also called for an alliance between farmers and labor; the creation of jobs in the postwar era; and, in the rhetoric of the wartime popular front, the defeat of fascism abroad and at home. Patton and other FU figures were disappointed when Wallace, who shared similar views on these issues, was dropped from the ticket in 1944, and later they lobbied hard for his confirmation as secretary of commerce in Roosevelt's last cabinet. Even before FDR's death, Wallace was seen by many in liberal circles, including the Farmers Union, as the spokesman for the left wing of the New Deal, and he clearly emerged with that mantle in the immediate postwar era.Â fter FDR's death, the NFU, like many other New Deal supporters, initially was pleased with Truman as president. It approved of his choice of Clinton P. Anderson as secretary of agriculture, and Patton told National Union Farmer readers in its October 1945 issue, "we must rally behind President Truman!" He went on to say, "The President has outlined to Congress a progressive, enlightened program for the United States which Liberals, 1947 -1954 (Amherst, MA, 1978 ; Steven M. Gillon, Polities and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947 -1985 (New York and Oxford, 1987 , 12, For the Communist party in the postwar era, see Joseph R. Starobin, American Communism in Crisis, 1943 -1957 (Cambridge, MA, 1972 (Princeton, NJ, 1979), 265-68; Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, 155-64; Gillon, Politics and Vision, 12-22. movement either on the basis of new or old political parties but under the leadership of Henry Wallace or someone like him." The North Dakota union sponsored a Wallace speech in Bismarck later that spring and gave his efforts a great deal of publicity.'* Baldwin and Wallace courted the Farmers Union throughout 1947. In a New Republic article, the former vice-president heaped praise upon the NFU leadership. He singled out the North Dakota union for special attention, asserting at one point, "the farmers of North Dakota are moving toward a new agrarian radicalism."17 Baldwin was in frequent contact with Patton throughout the year. Nothing in the written record suggests that Patton ever encouraged the third party approach to Wallace's aide, but the tone was always cordial and friendly. To many observers it probably looked like the Farmers Union was in the Wallace camp to stay.
After the third party decision was announced on December 29,1947, many Wallace backers assumed that Patton ultimately would join in. In early February 1948, the steering committee of the Progressive campaign met in Chicago. One of the topics of discussion was Wallace's running mate. Idaho Senator Glen Taylor already had been asked, but had not yet decided. The minutes of this meeting reveal that Patton was the group's third choice and that both Thatcher and Talbott also were mentioned as possibilities. 18 Yet by this time Patton and Thatcher already had told intimates that they were opposed to the third party campaign, and Talbott's board had decided not to back the THE SINGLE BIGGEST ISSUE was that of the third party.
Patton, Thatcher, and Talbott were all disenchanted with Truman and were quite willing to encourage Wallace within the Democratic party, but each of them had expressed grave reservations about third party efforts in 1948. In August 1947, Patton told Baldwin, ''Beanny[,] I see no hope of accomplishing anything-NOW-in a 3rd Party unless we want to bring Fascism faster ... but I feel we would have it a long time and the people of the world would be more victimized by our military corporatism than they are now. It seems to me that all possible effort should be made to elect a Congress-even if an SOB is President." The farm leader also indicated that he was considering running for the U.S. Senate in Colorado in 1948 and that public support for Wallace would hurt him politically. Despite that consideration, he momentarily agreed to sign a pro-Wallace statement that Baldwin had sent. Two days later, however, Patton changed his mind and withdrew his signature.^" Apparently he was concerned that this public gesture might be interpreted as support for a third party; he also feared the harm it might do him politically and perhaps the NFU as well.
Once Wallace announced his third party candidacy in late 1947, Patton publicly stated that the Farmers Union would not 'commit itself on any candidate in this year's three-corner race for president." Privately, he told Emil Loriks, "I have in no way lost my feeling for the things he [Wallace] stands for. Unless some radical change comes about, I will cast my personal vote for him as President." But he also told Aubrey Williams that he didn't think that state FU presidents should "endorse presidential candidates at this time." Two months later Charles Brannan, a close friend and then assistant secretary of agriculture, ex- pressed concern over a report he had heard that Patton was about to endorse Wallace. The farm leader immediately sent Brannan a telegram denying the story.^Ŷ et while he urged an uncommitted stance, Patton continued to offer advice and sought to influence both Truman and Wallace. He met with Truman, successfully lobbied for Brannan as Anderson's successor, and seemingly was on good terms with the president despite his earlier criticism. Brannan's appointment, followed by Patton's inclusion on a U.S. delegation to western Europe, helped cement his relations with Truman.^^ After the Democratic convention, the president asked the Eightieth Congress for action on a wide range of new proposals. Patton immediately telegraphed, "The Farmers Union is 100 percent behind your recommendations." Prior to this message, Truman had invited Patton to the White House "to discuss Long Range Agricultural programs." Patton's memorandum of this meeting reports that the two men discussed a range of topics, and a subsequent letter from Patton to Williams demonstrates that Truman had persuaded him of his good intentions in the realm of foreign policy.^^ Patton followed up the visit with a letter to Truman detailing suggestions for an October visit between the president and Stalin. He noted the political potential of such an initiative, saying, "I believe that it would be dramatic enough so that it would catch both Republicans and the Wallaceites flat-footed, and it would come late enough in the campaign so that it would be almost impossible for them to stir up any defense or propaganda."^'' Never supportive of a third party effort in 1948, Patton seemingly was in Truman's corner by late summer of that year.
Yet the farm leader also attempted to influence the Wallace campaign from the inside. His administrative assistant. Lee Fryer, was a Wallace supporter, and Patton "loaned" him to the Progressives for a Chicago meeting in April 1948. Upon returning to NFU headquarters in Denver, Fryer wrote a detailed letter of suggestions to Rexford Tugwell, then an adviser to the Wallace campaign. Much of it related to broadening the base of the Wallace movement and reducing the influence (or at least the visibility) of Communists in the organization,^^ Later, in July, Fryer elaborated on the same themes in a letter to Louis Adamic, another Wallace backer. The NFU functionary premised his recommendations on a Wallace break with the Communist party, which he argued was essential and should occur prior to the Progressive party convention. Included among Fryer's proposals was the suggestion of a total campaign organization shakeup: "He [Wallace] cleans house in his national organization, removing Beanie and all the others, who seem to form the narrow ideological group. He brings Glen Taylor into this operation as a counsellor." Fryer claimed that this "purge" could be carried out without "red-baiting" or damage to the campaign.^Ĥ ow much was the sorcerer's apprentice speaking for himself and how much was he speaking for the sorcerer? At the time, Adamic and perhaps others believed that Fryer probably was representing Patton's views as well,2'' Though the farm leader 26, Fryer to Adamic, 10 July [1948] , Wallace Papers, Fryer claimed, "I know at least 10 untapped people of surpassing competence, not now in the Wallace movement, who would help put over a clean organization in the third party. The lack of available competent personnel need not be a serious problem," 27, Adamic forwarded a copy of Fryer's letter to Wallace, saying, "I think this will interest you. You know Lee Fryer, I'm sure that Jim Patton feels pretty much the same," Adamic to Wallace, [ca, 12 July 1948] , Wallace Papers, was moving toward Truman, this shift was not public, and his private remarks to some seemed sympathetic to Wallace. A West Coast Progressive, Nina Dexter, had called Patton in early July. According to her account, "although very much for Wallace," he was concerned about the campaign organization.^^ A few days prior to Fryer's letter to Adamic, Patton himself had sketched out a similar scheme to a correspondent in regard to Wallace severing his ties with the Communists. He told A. W. Ricker, the retired editor of the Farmers Union Herald, If the Democrats run Truman, then I think that there should be a major effort made for the Americans for Democratic Action group and the Wallace group to get together behind Wallace on a long-time Third Party proposition. Certainly the only way that this can be done effectively is for Wallace to read the brethren [Communists] out, and at the same time begin to discuss in philosophical terms the long range thing beyond the November election.^' Patton's stance changed by the end of July, however. Truman had been nominated, the Progressive convention had been held, and the NFU leader had visited the White House. Both Aubrey Williams, president of the Alabama FU, and Ricker wrote to him of their enthusiasm for the third party platform and Wallace's acceptance speech.^o By then, Patton was quite 28. Dexter to Jess Gitt, 30 August 1948, Jess Gitt Papers, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Pennsylvania. Emphasis added. In an earlier letter. Dexter wrote, "In talking to Jim Patton the other day on the telephone he told me that he had talked with Beanie about many issues in the State Committees of certain people who wanted everything to be either black or white and would not compromise, but Jim did not approve of Wallace redbaiting and he also said that many of these people in the State Committees, as well as those (maybe) in the New York office, none of which he mentioned in particular, did not necessarily belong to the Communist Party in any way, but that they were too black and white in their wishes to do things and did not have enough cooperation for people who differed with each other. Jim told me that Wallace and Beanie were old friends of his and it was very hard for him to criticize anything because he believed so much in what we are fighting for in For an outfit that has a reputation for being left-wing and progressive, they certainly have toned their stuff down. It is ridiculous for them to attempt to cut and hedge with the thought in mind that they can influence the American economic and political scene by such procedure. Had they really been progressive, they would have struck out hard, with biting programs which would have the effect of doing a fundamental job of redistributing income in this country.^' Patton's behavior in the 1948 campaign suggests a desire on his part to run with both the fox and the hounds. Wanting to be considered a radical privately, he almost always assumed a more moderate posture publicly. In 1948 he himself had testified in favor of the Hope-Aiken bill, which provided for flexible price supports by 1950, while in private he criticized the Wallace effort for not advocating a more radical farm program.-'^ By the early fall the NFU head was pretty well committed to Truman, though pessimistic about his chances for election.^^ Privately, however, he still may have hoped for the eventual formation of a left-wing movement "untainted" with Communist involvement.
The other Farmers Union notables also discretely avoided committing themselves to the Wallace crusade. Thatcher, more than the others, was indebted to Wallace and Baldwin. In October 1946 he invited the former vice-president to speak at the dedication of the new GTA building and asserted, "There would be no great GTA and these fine buildings except for Franklin D. Roosevelt and Henry A. Wallace." Less than one year later, how- ever, when talk of a third party bolt was in the air, Thatcher cautioned his old friend against this drastic step. "I hold no brief for Mr. Truman nor am I anxious to see him return to the White House," he wrote in July 1947, but he felt that a third party effort would "deliver Dewey, Taft, or Vandenburg into the White House, and you would be forever blamed for it." The GTA head counseled Wallace to wait until 1952. When the third party bid was announced, Thatcher quickly assured Hubert Humphrey that he would not support it.^* Talbott, a less visionary figure than Patton, seemingly was more tempted by the Progressive cause than his two Farmers Union associates.^5 Earlier, he and the North Dakota FU had been strong backers of Wallace. Though indicating his disapproval of a third party in October 1947, he may have given the matter some additional consideration in the new year. The North Dakota FU had organized a political arm, the Fanners Union Progressive Alliance (FUPA), to mobilize its forces against conservative opponents in state politics. Its director was Quentin Burdick, the union's counsel and a strong Wallace advocate. He and others hoped that the Alliance would endorse the former vice-president's bid.
Talbott reported that all of the organization's directors were "strong Henry Wallace supporters," but they declined to endorse him. This decision, according to the FU leader, "was taken after hours of discussion" because of the local necessity of working through the Republican party. He "had discussed this matter in detail with Beanie Baldwin and he and Henry were in thorough agreement on this position." Still, Talbott himself was thought by some to be in Wallace's camp. Fred Stover, the Iowa FU president and a strong third party man, recalls that the North Dakota farm leader told Wallace at a private Minneapolis meeting in early 1948 that he would publicly endorse him, but had to wait until after the Republican primary. No such endorsement ever was made, however. Biederman, who was the Progressive party's gubernatorial candidate.*" The FU's Eastern Division, which included New Jersey and Pennsylvania, officially endorsed Wallace, and many of its New Jersey members were strong proponents of the Progressive campaign.^B ackers of the former vice-president were scattered throughout other state organizations as well. Some accounts of the 1948 NFU convention testify to the presence of strong third party sentiments among the delegates.*^ But none of the large state organizations was publicly identified in the Wallace camp. Iowa and the Eastern Division were among the smaller state units, and their leadership, along with that in Minnesota, was less cautious than that in the national office. North Dakota, or the GTA.« Ultimately, the "political realities" of American liberalism account for the failure of Patton and the Farmers Union to back Wallace in 1948. Although they worried about the prospects of a Republican president, FU leaders probably were more concerned about the continuation of GOP control of Congress. The Eightieth Congress had given them fits, and the Wallace candidacy threatened to erode electoral support for liberal Democrats, many of whom were proven friends of the Farmers Union. were open backers of the Wallace effort, making it easier to characterize it as a "Communist front." Had Patton and the FU opted for the Progressive cause they would have opened themselves up for further attack and risked large membership losses. As it was, the Farmers Union in many communities was subjected to scurrilous attacks as a "red" organization, and the Union's leadership was acutely aware of that threat.
WALLACE'S FAILURE to attract more rural voters to his cause was not, however, due solely to such "political realities." The Wallace campaign's neglect of the farm issue may have diminished the appeal of the third party effort in the countryside. In late May 1948 the former New Deal secretary of agriculture admitted his neglect of the farm issue. "Thus far," he said, "I've been concentrating my campaign efforts on the urban areas. I've been relying on the fact that I'm pretty well known in the rural districts to help me."'*'' Despite prodding from some backers, Wallace continued his neglect of the farm issue throughout the remainder of the campaign. The big issues that year were foreign policy and civil rights. One sympathetic observer later noted, "the goal was as big a vote as possible, and the best way to attain it was perceived to be the major urban areas."*T he campaign appointed a farm director in the late summer of 1948, but paid little attention to his ideas. He was Homer Ayres, a South Dakota sheep rancher who had participated in the rural revolt of the 1930s and in the Farmers Union, and most recently served as the farm-labor director of the Farm Equipment Workers (CIO). His responsibilities included arranging a September farm conference in Chicago and writing farm materials for the campaign. He later noted that his colleagues in the na- tional office "pushed the farm stuff to one side," as few there knew much or "gave a damn about farmers."** The Chicago farm meeting was held in September and attracted approximately thirty delegates. Wallace, Elmer Benson, Fred Stover, and Eastern Division FU president Ed Yeomans were among its participants. It covered a wide range of farm topics, and Wallace reportedly "told C. B. Baldwin he learned more about the farm problem those two days than he ever knew in his life." This same source, however, also remembers that Wallace kept dropping off to sleep during the sessions.*F ollowing the Progressive Farm Conference, some of the farm activists felt that their candidate would then address the farm issue. Their hopes were unjustified, however; Wallace made only one publicized farm speech in the campaign. It came at Moorhead, Minnesota, in October, and received little publicity. Whether or not more attention to agricultural matters would have significantly enhanced Wallace's vote in rural areas, the failure even to try reflected the urban bias of thé campaign managers. No matter what Wallace said or did, he would not have gained the public backing of Patton or Thatcher. On the other hand, a frontal assault on the Administration's farm policy, coupled with a forceful presentation of the Progressive farm plank, may have recruited more FU members to the Progressive banner. Stover, Benson, Ayres, and others had tried to raise the farm issue in the campaign, but their efforts were undercut by their standard bearer and his managers.*^ It was an old story in Amer-46. Homer Ayres to author, 12 January 1973 , February 1973 In the CIO, for example, "left" unions were expelled in part for their opposition to the Marshall Plan and their support of Wallace's candidacy. 5^ Here and elsewhere, this apostasy was interpreted as a sign of disloyalty and grounds for excommunication. The NFU, however, held no such inquisition at the time. When the Truman Administration called for a new approach to farm ques-tions with the Brannan Plan, the Farmers Union went all out for it. Still troubled by the Cold War posturing, Patton, Talbott, and others continued to criticize Truman's foreign policy and openly opposed NATO when it was proposed.*" In this respect, the Fanners Union differed from many mainstream liberal organizations. It had weathered the Wallace candidacy with little dissension, and what divisions existed seemingly were papered over with a common commitment to Fair Deal measures at home and criticism of major Truman policies overseas.*N ot until the fighting in Korea began did the NFU undergo internal turmoil akin to that which earlier had disrupted the ranks of organized labor. Then, Patton and the NFU endorsed Truman's foreign policy, including U.S. involvement in Korea, and took steps to disassociate themselves from left-wing critics of the Administration. Henry Wallace himself quickly announced support of U.S. policy in Korea. But some of his earlier supporters in the NFU, such as Fred Stover and key figures in the Eastern Division, remained in opposition and ultimately were purged by the nation's only liberal farm organization.^T he 1948 Wallace campaign was a watershed for the left, but it was not a major turning point for the Farmers Union. That came later, when its leadership decided that there was no place 60. Crampton, National Farmers Union, 217, writes, "At the time the Korean War broke out, the Union had an official record of opposition to the major programs of the Truman foreign policy." This comment is an exaggeration. The NFU was not officially opposed to the Marshall Plan, though some state units such as Minnesota had openly rejected it. At the state level, the "red" issue did surface prior to the Korean fighting: the Wisconsin organization removed two employees from the state office in early 1948; South Dakota terminated two or three fieldmen in early 1949 reportedly over this question; and . Einar Kuivinen was defeated for reelection as Minnesota president in late 1949 at least in part because of his popular front stance, a step that led to other individuals also losing their jobs with the state FU. The national organization, however, did not participate in such efforts and refused to adopt a membership prohibition against Communists. This information is based on unpublished research by the author. 62. For a brief discussion of this topic, see Dyson, Red Harvest, ; and Pratt, "Glenn J. Talbott, the Farmers Union, and American Liberalism after World War II." 369 in its organization for affiliates that opposed Truman's foreign policy from the left. By that time, however, the remnants of the popular front were in complete disarray, and the Cold War mentality had an iron-clad grip on American liberalism.
